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We are by nature stubbornly pledged to defend our own
from attack, whether it be our person, our family, our
property or our opinion .... The little word my is the most
important one in all human affairs, and properly to
reckon with it is the beginning of wisdom.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Should the right to reproduce creative expressions be given the
status of a property right as they are in many Western states 2 and
international conventions?3 This is a question that has plagued humanity
for centuries 4 and is part of the current debate taking place in
international human rights law between those who advocate more
1. James Harvey Robinson, The Mind in the Making 41, 45-46 (1921), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=zyAVAAAALAAJ.
2. E.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-106A.
3. E.g., Berne Convention For the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971,
828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
4. For example, Thomas Jefferson was not, at first, in agreement with the notion of even a
limited monopoly for copyright. See Hannibal Travis, Piratesof the Information Infrastructure:
Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 815 (2000)..
Indeed, Thomas Jefferson stated, "[t]he saying there shall be no monopolies lessens the incitements
to ingenuity, which is spurred on by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as of 14. years; but
the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general
suppression. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 442-43 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds. 1950), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlch14s46.html;
see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
IntellectualProperty is Still Property, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 108, 109 (1990); Wendy J.
Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and
EncouragementTheory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343, 1344-52.
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access to copyrighted and patented materials and those who advocate
more protection for intellectual property.' But what seems to be missing
from this debate is why the right to reproduce creative expressions ever
became a property right in much of the Western world. Most of the
commentary on the question of a property right in creative expressions
focuses on utilitarian and economic perspectives taking for granted the
existence of a property right as if such a right emerged fully formed
from the head of Zeus.6 But there is a dearth of discussion examining
the significance, if any, of the simple fact that people throughout history
have referred to creative expressions as "mine," possibly indicating the
belief in a possessory interest which evolved into a property right.
This paper explores the reference to a creative expression as "mine"
in relation to the question of why there is a property right in the
reproduction of creative expressions from an historical, philosophical
and social psychological perspective. And why does this matter? The
law is not created in a vacuum; it reflects history, human nature,
culture, and many other considerations. As the introductory quotation
properly points out, we must understand the human tendency to lay
claim to creative expressions in order to have the wisdom to decide if a
legal property right should still be acknowledged or if it is time to
consider some alternatives. History, philosophy and social psychology
relating to intellectual property, specifically copyright, and property in
general provides a rich resource for such a discourse though not a
panacea.
The first section examines the historical evidence using written and
verbal expressions from ancient Greece, Rome and pre-copyright
history in England. Although the historical evidence does not indicate
any copyright law as we know it today in the ancient period, it does
indicate the existence of a belief in a possessory interest in creative
expressions and their reproduction. This belief continued through the
middle ages both before and after the invention of the printing press.
Due to the abundance of evidence, and in the interest of brevity, this
paper utilizes a case study of England. We see in this case study the
increasing political and economic importance of the printing trade after
5. See Pilar N. Ossorio, The Human Genome As Common Heritage: Common Sense or
Legal Nonsense?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 425 (2007); Audrey R. Chapman, The Human Rights
Implications of Intellectual Property Protection,5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 861 (2002); Jamie Crook,
BalancingIntellectualPropertyProtectionwith the Human Right to Health,23 BERKELEYJ. INT'L
L. 524 (2005).
6. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11-36 (2003); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, andFair
Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3-13, 57-63 (1987).
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the introduction of the printing press in England resulting in a
solidification of the possessory interest in creative expressions and their
reproduction in the form of a property right first in the Crown and then
in creators and their assigns.
The second part of this paper examines some suggestions about
human nature through philosophical theories that have been utilized in
an attempt to justify a property right in the right to reproduce creative
expressions. Specifically, the natural law philosophy; the personality
theory; and the utilitarian theory have all been cited as justification for
the treatment of the right to reproduce an expression as a property right.
While this paper treats the various theories in isolation some states,
such as the United States, invoke natural law, the personality theory,
and utilitarianism to justify the existence of a property right in
copyright law.7
Finally, this paper looks to social psychology for a cultural answer
to the question why creative expressions and their reproduction are
treated as a property right. Again, Western notions are emphasized
because it is from the West that we get this property right in creative
expressions and their reproduction. Here I explore the early social
psychology theory of biological instinct to explain the human need for
property basically as an accident of nature. Conversely, the personality
theory in social psychology explains a human need for property through
a fetish phenomenon. The last theory in this section is the social
psychology theory of social construction to explain property. The social
constructionist theory provides an existential perspective in the
recognition that things, including creative expressions, exist before they
can be infused with the essence of property to meet the human need for
social communication.
This collage of essence justification indicates a lack of universalism
on the domestic level let alone the international level. Such a realization
leads this author to conclude that, while intangible things, such as
copyright, may be designated property, the rationalization for such a
designation is not universal except to the extent that all the different
justifications seem to be rooted in the inexplicable desires to call an
expression thing "mine."

7. See Elder v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (invoking utilitarian philosophy); id. at
245-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing examples of natural law and utilitarian philosophies);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206 n.5 (1954) (suggesting personality philosophy); Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903) (suggesting personality philosophy).
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE EXISTENCE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT IN
EXPRESSIONS AND THEIR REPRODUCTION

The reference of "mine," relating to an expression and the copying of
an expression, can be traced to the inception of recorded history. Prior
to the advent of the printing press, photograph, videotape, copy
machine, computer, tape recorder, etc., appropriation of another's
artistic creations was difficult but not impossible. Although the
visualization of some scribe furiously chiseling away at a stone tablet in
order to copy the words of some great orator may bemuse us in this
modem era of techno-copying, it was not amusing to those whose
works were usurped. Still, plagiarism seems to have been endemic in
the ancient world,8 leaving us here today with a plethora of recorded
evidence condemning the act.9 These recorded responses indicate a
belief among ancient creators that an expression could have the quality
of a possessory interest and the unauthorized reproduction of an
expression was a theft.
A. Interests in Expressions in Ancient Greece
Although there is little documentary evidence remaining regarding
ancient Greek law,' ° ancient Greek plays provide an example of the
social attitude towards plagiarism. 1 For instance, in Aristophanes' play
Frogs, Dionysus, the divine patron of drama, is distraught after the
death of the tragic poet Euripides in 405 B.C.E. as he believes that all
the great tragic poets are dead. Dionysus resolves to descend into the
underworld to bring back Euripides. In the beginning scene, Dionysus
encounters Heracles (Hercules) and engages in a discussion about
whether Euripides or another great tragic poet, Sophocles, should be
brought back:
Heracles:

But say, why don't you bring
Sophocles

up

8. ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 65 (1952); H.M. PAULL, LITERARY
ETHICS: A STUDY IN THE GROWTH OF THE LITERARY CONSCIENCE 103 (1929); GEORGE HAVEN
PUTNAM, AUTHORS AND THEIR PUBLIC IN ANCIENT TIMES (3d ed. 1967). There appears to be an

abundance of evidence that the ancients freely pilfered stories and expressions from each other. For
example, there are numerous diluvial stories such as the one found in the Epic of Gilgamesh and
in the Bible. CompareTHE EPIC OF GILGAMESH: ANEW TRANSLATION 88-100, tablet XI (Penguin
Classics 1999) with Genesis 6:7 (King James).
9. PAULL, supra note 8, at 103.
10. DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 42-43 (1978).
11. See id.
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By preference, if you must have some one
back?
Dionysus:

No, not till I've had lophon quite alone
And seen what note he gives without his
father. 12

lophon was the son of Sophocles and was also a playwright.
Apparently, some of his plays were written in collaboration with his
father.13 This reference to Iophon was a less than subtle accusation of
plagiarism; specifically that lophon relied upon Sophocles or that
Sophocles relied upon lophon for creative expression.
Once in the underworld, Dionysus finds a contest in progress
between Euripides and the tragic poet AEeschylus for the Throne of
Poetry. Dionysus is selected to judge who between these contestants is
the greater poet. As the characters of Euripides and ,Eeschylus first take
the stage they are hurling insults at each other, including an accusation
of plagiarism from .Eeschylus:
.Eeschylus:

How say'st thou, Son o' the goddess of
the Greens? -

You dare speak thus of me, you phrasecollector,
Blind-beggar-bard and scum of rifled ragbags!
Oh, you shall rue it!
Because my poetry hasn't died with me,
As his has ....

12. ARISTOPHANES, THE FROGS, in EURIPIDES 186 (Gilbert Murray trans., Longmans, Green,
& Co. 1902).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 240-41. Much of the evidence of the belief in a possessory interest from ancient
texts is in the use of the possessory words "my" and "mine." I would like to thank my colleague,
Professor Ned Snow, for his suggestion that this may only establish a creative relationship and not
something akin to a property right in the minds of the ancients. We will probably never know just
what was in the minds of the ancients and certainly relying on translations, as this author had to do,
create a plethora of problems. That said, if the translations are accurate "my" and "mine" do
connote a possessory interest. CONCISE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 754, 783 (8th
ed. 1990).
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It is apparent from this satirical treatment of plagiarism that there was a
belief in a possessory interest
in a creative work by claiming such
5
expressions as "my poetry.'

Further evidence of a possessory claim to a creative expression and
its copy is recounted in the story by the first century B.C.E. Roman
architect, Marci Vitruvius in Book VII of his seminal work "The Ten
Books on Architecture" about an act of plagiarism at a festival in
celebration of the opening of the famous library of Alexandria. In the
story Vitruvius recounts how several poets were found guilty of copying
the works of others, were accused of theft, and banished. 6 His story
indicates the belief in a possessory interests going back at least as far as
the Greco/Roman period in the first century B.C.E. by claiming the two
poets that most pleased the audience "recited things not their own" and
by use of the term "theft."' 7 In these examples we see a belief in the
existence of a possessory interest in expressions but nothing to indicate
the essence of that interest. So, while we do know that in the minds of
the ancient Greeks a possessory interest did exist, we do not know what
legal right, if any, existed.
B. Interests in Expressions in Ancient Roman
The authors of ancient Rome were in an interesting juxtaposition in
relation to their ancient Greek counterparts. Being the conquerors, they
were for all practical purposes free to pilfer from the vanquished
including the literary works of the Greeks.' 8 Moribus antiquis res stat
Romana virisque.'9 Certainly, imitation is the highest form of
compliment," and the ancient Romans held the literary works of the
ancient Greeks in high esteem.2 ' Yet, such altruistic motives apparently
15. PAULL, supra note 8, at 103; PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 68, 73.
16. VITRUVIus, THE TEN BOOKS ON ARCHITECTURE, BOOK VII, at 195-197 (Morris H.

Morgan, trans., Kessinger 2005). Ptolemy III reigned from around 246-222 B.C.E. and is probably
the Ptolemy referred to by Vitruvius given the fact that Aristophanes the Grammarian lived around
257-185 B.C.E. However, Ptolemy I is usually given credit for creating the great library of
Alexandria. See The House of Ptolemy: Kings, Queens, and the Rest of the Royal Ptolemies,
http://www.houseofptolemy.org/housekng.htm#RULERS (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
17. VrrRUvIUS, supra note 16, at 197.
18. TERENCE, THE EUNUCH, in THE COMEDIES 155-56 (Peter Brown trans., 2006); PUTNAM,
supra note 8, at 167-68.
19. Translated, this statement by Quintus Ennius (239-169 B.C.E.) means, "On ancient ways
and heroes stands the Roman state." See STEPHEN BERTMAN, CULTURAL AMNESIA: AMERICA'S
FUTURE AND THE CRISIS OF MEMORY 39 (2000).
20. CHARLES CALEB COLTON, LACON OR MANY THINGS 1N FEW WORDS: ADDRESSED TO

THOSE WHO THINK 101 (Kessinger 2004) (1820).
21. LINDEY, supra note 8, at 66.
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held little value when one was the victim of the compliment. Thus,
while Virgil imitated Homer 2 and purloined verses from his fellow
Romans, 23 he reputedly complained when accorded with reciprocal
compliments. 4
Unlike the Greeks, the Romans had more specific, codified laws;
however, much is missing from the historic record leaving the scope and
breadth of the law open to speculation. Certainly, there is no evidence to
date of a specific copyright code in ancient Rome. Yet, the evidence that
we do have indicates the existence of a belief in a possessory interest in
expressions and the reproduction of expressions.
1. References to Creative Expressions as "Mine" in Ancient Rome
Reference to creative expressions as "mine" and accusations of theft
or plagiarism are too prolific in the ancient Roman record to ignore. For
example, the first century (A.D.) Roman epigrammatist Martial is
credited with the first use of the term plagium to describe the conduct of
those who copied from his works.2 ' His epigrams on the subject reflect
his strong views regarding this practice:
To your charge I entrust, Quintianus, my works - if,
after all, I can call those mine which that poet of yours
recites. If they complain of their grievous servitude,
come forward as their champion and give bail for them;
and when that fellow calls himself their owner, say that
they are mine, sent forth from my hand. If thrice and
26
four times you shout this, you will shame the plagiarist.
Rumour asserts, Fidentinus, that you recite my works to
the crowd, just as if they were your own. If you wish
they should be called mine, I will send you the poems
gratis; if you wish them to be called yours, buy my
disclaimer of them. 7

22. Id.; THOMAS MALLON, STOLEN WORDS 4 (Harvest 2001).

23. PAULL, supra note 8, at 104.
24. Id.
25. Plagiumdenoted kidnapping. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND

COPYRIGHT LAW 12-13 (1967); PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 203.
26. 1 MARTIAL, EPIGRAMS 63 (Walter C.A. Ker
http://books.google.com/books?id=w4ZfAAAAMAAJ.
27. Id. at 47.
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There is one page of yours, Fidentinus, in a book of mine
- a page, too, stamped by the distinct likeness of its
master - which convicts your poems of palpable
theft.... My books need no title or judge to prove them;
28
your page stares you in the face, and calls you "thief.
That book you recite, 0 Fidentinus, is mine. But your
vile recitation begins to make it your own.29
Corduba, . . . tell your poet, I beg you, to have some
shame, and not to recite my poems scot-free. I could bear
it if a good bard did this, one I could visit with pain in
his turn. A bachelor debauches without reprisal, a blind
man cannot lose that whereof he robs you. Nothing is
worse than a naked robber, nothing more safe than a bad
poet.3°
Martial's use the terms plagium, "thief," "my," and "mine" with
regard to use by others of his creative expression reflects some belief in
a possessory interest in the reproduction of expressions. Again, as with
the ancient Greeks, we do not know the essence of this right but we do
know that it existed at least in the minds of the creators.
2. Roman Law Relating to Theft of Intangibles
In support of Martial's protestations regarding his claims of
ownership over reproduction of his creative expressions the Roman
concept of natural law recognized property interests in intangibles and
the theft of those interests. 31 For example. "things" (res) under Roman
law covered all that had a pecuniary value. 2 This would include
tangible things (corporeal) and intangibles things (incorporeals).33 As
explained by Justinian:
Now, some things are corporeal, others incorporeal. Corporeal
things are those which, by their nature, can be touched, eg land,
28. Id.at 63, 65.
29. Id.at 53.
30. 2 MARTIAL, EPIGRAMS 365, 367 (Walter C.A. Ker trans., 1920), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=RIxiAAAAMAAJ.
31. See J. INST. 2.1,35-37 (J.A.C. Thomas trans., 1975).
32. J. INST. 2.1 cmt., in THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND
COMMENTARY, at 73 (J.A.C. Thomas trans., 1975).
33. Id.at 73-74.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

9

JOURNAL Law,
OF INTERNATIONAL
Florida Journal ofFLORIDA
International
Vol. 21, Iss.LAW
2 [2009], Art. 2

[Vol. 21

a slave, a garment, gold, silver and, indeed, countless other
things. Incorporeal things, on the other hand, are such as cannot
be touched but exist in law: for instance, an inheritance,
usufruct and obligations, however contracted.34
Under Roman law, theft was not just the taking and depriving
another of some tangible object; rather, it could include intangible
rights: theft includes "the fraudulent meddling with a thing, whether the
thing itself, the use or possession of it which one is barred from
countenancing by natural law."35 Further, Justinian stated, "theft occurs
not only when a person removes the thing of another with a view to
appropriate it but, generally, whenever someone interferes with the
property of another without the owner's consent., 36 It is not clear that
the belief in a possessory interest in an expression and its copy
translated into a property right under Roman law. What is clear,
however, is that when Martial accused others of "theft" of his
expressions he was asserting what he believed to be a property right
under Roman law relating to intangibles.
3. Roman Law Relating to Creative Works
Ancient Roman commentary supports a natural law, fruits-of-theirlabor, theory for artists' rights in a creation. Accordingly, one who
creates is entitled to the value for the creation.3 7 Natural law, or the
fruits-of-ones-labor, is reflected in The Institutes of Gaius, which
discuses the nature of a transaction involving material value mixed with
labor:
And again, if I have agreed with a goldsmith that he shall
make me with his own gold some rings of a certain
weight and pattern, and get say two hundred denarii for
them, it is a point of controversy whether this be
purchase and sale or location and conduction. Cassius
thinks there is purchase and sale of material, location and
conduction of the labour expended upon it; but the
general opinion is that the contract is one of purchase
and sale. But if I provide the gold, agreeing to give the
34. J. INST. 2.2.1-2; see also G. INST. 2.12-14 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans., 1988).
35. J. INST. 4.1.1.

36. J. INST. 4.1.6.
37. J. INST. 2.1.35-37. "Incorporeal" means "[h]aving a conceptual existence but no physical
existence; intangible" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (7th ed. 2004). For example, copyrights and
patents are incorporeal property. Id.
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goldsmith so much for his labour, the contract is
admittedly one of location and conduction.38
Evidentially, the ancient Romans assigned some economic value to the
labor expended in the creative process, similar to Locke's natural law
theory regarding the fruits-of-ones-labor.
Justinian's writings on Roman natural law may clarify the legal
question of who owns the end product made out of another's
material-he who made the end product or he who owned the material.39
This question is interesting in the copyright context as it evidences a
legal dilemma addressed by the Romans with regard to the property
rights stemming from the creative process. For example, if one makes a
vase out of another's gold who owns the vase? If one makes an eyesalve out of someone else's drugs who owns the eye-salve? The natural
law solution, according to the Romans, was:
if the product can be reduced again to its original
material, he who was owner of the materials owns the
thing; but if it cannot be so reduced, then he rather is
owner who makes the thing[.]4 °
This result did not mean that the owner of materials made into an
irreducible nova species was without recourse. 4' However, this does
indicate recognition of a property right in the creative process.42
Another legal dilemma that the Romans resolved through the use of
natural law involved the issue of ownership of an end product with
respect to a writing or a painting:
Writing, again, even though it be in gold lettering, accedes to the
paper or vellum in the same way that buildings accede to the
land or the seeds planted therein. Thus, if Titius write a song or
narrative on your paper or vellum, not Titius but you will be
regarded as the owner thereof. But if you claim your books or
vellum from Titius but are unwilling to pay the cost of the
writing, Titius can put up the defence of fraud, assuming - that
38. G. INST. 3.147. Location and conduction, or locatio-conductio,in civil law is a contract
of bailment for hire. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (7th ed. 2004).
39. J. INST. 2.1.25.
40. Id..
41. J. INST. 2.1.25 cmt., in THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTiNIAN: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND
COMMENTARY, at 78-79 (J.A.C. Thomas trans. 1975).; G. INST. 2.79.
42. J. INST. 2.1.25 cmt., supra note 41.
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is - that he is in possession of the paper or vellum in good faith.
If one person paint on another's board, there are some who think
that the board accedes to the picture while others hold that the
picture, whatever it be, accedes to the board. To us, however, it
appears preferable that the board accede to the painting: for it is
absurd that a painting by Apelles or Parrhasius should, by
accession, become part of a cheap board. Hence, if the artist
seek the painting from the owner of the board who is in
possession of it and does not give the price of the board, he can
be met with the defence of fraud: but, equally, if the painter be
in possession, it follows that the owner of the board will be
given against him an extended action (actio utilis); in which
case, if the owner be unwilling to pay the cost of the painting, he
can be repelled by the defence of fraud, assuming the painter to
be a possessor in good faith of the painting. It goes without
saying, of course, that the owner has the action for theft in
respect of the board, whether it be stolen by the artist or by
someone else.43
The above example reflects some consideration given by the Romans to
the issue of ownership of the creative process." Of further import is the
specific mention of the artists, Apelles45 and Parrhasius46 showing some
value in reputation to the artist and the inference of increased economic
value to the board by paintings of artists of such caliber.
While the history of the ancient Greeks and Romans does not
provide a clear explanation for the existence of a property right in
creative expressions both seem to indicate the belief in the existence of
a possessory interest and possibly even a property right.
C. Interests in Expressions From the Medieval Periodto the Enactment
of the Statute of Anne (476-1709)
Before the means for mass copying developed with the invention of
the printing press, there was a continuation of the belief of a possessory
interesting in expressions and their reproduction in the West. A
property right was solidified in England with the introduction of the
printing press when the Crown claimed a property right in certain
43. J. INST. 2.1.33-34; see also G. INST. 2.79.
44. J. INST. 2.1.25 cmt., supra note 41.
45. Apelles was a Greek painter who flourished in the fourth century B.C.E. Apelles,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://original.britannica.com/eb/article-9007988.
46. Parrhasius was a Greek painter who flourished in the fifth century B.C.E. Parrhasius,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://original.britannica.com/eb/article-9058554.
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printed materials.47 In order to print an expression one had to obtain a
license to do so from the Crown. This licensing requirement was little
more than a means for censorship, but it was effective until political
power was neutralized by civil war.4 After the English civil war the
printing trade tried to reassert control by advocating a licensing
requirement and through the claim of a property right, but there was
little public support for this due to the abuses of censorship under the
old system." To alleviate this lack of support there was a change in
emphasis from a property right for publishers to the protection of
authors' property rights in the name of promoting education." This
change of focus culminated in the passage of the first known copyright
statute, the statute of Anne, in 1709.52
1. Pre-Printing Press
The fall of the Roman Empire in the West occurred around 476
A.D. 3 This resulted in a fractured Western Empire, although the
Eastern Empire remained intact for some time. Despite the demise of a
central authority in the West, literature continued to prosper. Devoid of
a mechanism to quickly reproduce and with limited market demand due
to a mostly illiterate populace, the process of printing was by hand
(manuscripts).
The high value placed on manuscripts and issues relating to a
property right in a copy from a manuscript are evidenced in the story of
Saint Columba's copying his masters' book of Psalter. This story is
based upon oral tradition but reduced to writing at least as early as
1532. 54 As the story goes, Saint Columba, while visiting his master the
abbot Finnen, made an unauthorized copy of Finnen's Psalter at night
47.
48.
49.
50.

FEATHER, supra note 63, at 10-11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 40-48.
Id. at 40-48; JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE

LIBERTY OF UNLICENC'D PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), available at

http://www.uoregon.edu/-rbear/areopagitica.html.
51. BLOUNT, supra note 114, at 1-2.
52. Copyright Act, 1709, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.).

53. Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, The Globalisation of Regulation 6 (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0200.pdf.
54. Saint Columba lived around 560 A.D. The story has been attributed to Adomnan's life
of Columba (around 628 A.D.) However, a reading of Adomnan does not directly refer to this tale.

It merely mentions an act by Columba that was not very egregious but caused the Saint to leave
Ireland. ADOMNAN, LIFE OF COLUMBA 185 (Alan Orr Anderson & Majorie Ogilvie Anderson trans.
1991). The earliest written reference I could locate was in the 1532 text, MANUS O'DONNELL, LIFE
OF COLUMCILLE 179 (A. O'Kelleher & G. Schoepperle eds. 1918) ("To every book its transcript.").
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while none could observe what he was doing; or so he thought.5 A
passer-by noticed the light by which Saint Columba was copying and
observed through a window the not-so-saintly act of Columba's
copying. 6 This was reported to Finnen, who claimed this act to be a
theft and the copy to be his as he was the owner of the original. 7
Columba refused to give up the copy and the matter was submitted to
the High King, Diarmaid.5" The judgment rendered by the king was in
favor of Finnen: "To every cow her young cow, that is, her calf, and to
every book its transcript. And therefore to to Finnen belongeth the book
thou hast written, 0 Columeille [Columba]."59 While some
commentators dispute the veracity of this story,6" it does reflect a social
attitude regarding a property interest in the copying of written works
going back at least to 1532.61
2. The Introduction of the Printing Press in the United Kingdom
The first known moveable-type printing press was invented in 1450
by Johannes Gutenburg.62 When William Caxton introduced the
printing press in England in 1477,63 the novelty of printing seemed of
little import; however, it was soon observed that printing could be of
benefit to the political powers, the Church and Crown, as a means to
disseminate propaganda.' 4 For his part, Caxton seemed to be motivated
by a desire to educate and enlighten his countrymen with literature at a
reasonable cost. However, Caxton's motives were not purely altruistic.
55. O'DONNELL, supra note 54, at 177.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 179.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also 1 GEORGE H. PUTNAM, BOOKS AND THEIR MAKERS INTHE MIDDLE AGES 46,
81(1896).
60. See, e.g., Brendan Scott, Copyright in a Frictionless World: Toward a Rhetoric of
Responsibility, 6 FIRST MONDAY 1, 3 (2001), available at http://firstmonday.org/issues/

issue6_9/scott/; AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT
IN BOOKS 42 (1899).
61. O'DONNELL, supranote 54, at 177, 179. I believe that this story reflects a much earlier

social attitude regarding the copying of written materials as there is quite often at least a grain of
truth in stories based upon oral tradition; for example the existence of Troy. However, unlike Troy,
which left physical evidence to establish the truth of the matter asserted by Homer, the social
attitudes of members of an oral culture leaves no physical evidence resulting in speculation and
conjecture regarding such issues.
62. Zack Kertcher & Ainat N. Margalit, Challengesto Authority, Burdens ofLegitimization:
The PrintingPressand the Internet, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1,n.77 (citing MIRIAM ELIAV-FELDON,
THE PRINTING REVOLUTION 29 (2000)).
63. JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS 10 (1994).
64. HENRY R. PLOMER, WLIAM CAXTON 85 (1925).
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He was, after all, a business man and a marketing genius. He accurately
predicted the market by translating numerous texts into English and
published English writers such as Geoffrey Chaucer and John Lydgate.
Thus, although there may have been a comparatively small percentage
of the population who were literate at this time, Caxton exploited this
market to its fullest.65 While there was some competition for Caxton in
the London market within two years after he set up shop,66 it posed no
threat primarily because his competitors did not print their texts in
English.67
As the printing novelty grew in popularity, the texts grew in
subjects and in language. This expansion was viewed as a threat to the
political powers.68 Accordingly, in 1504 the Crown started to grant
Royal Prerogatives, a license also known as letters patents, for the right
to print certain materials.69 This power vested in the Crown was based
upon an alleged property right held by the Crown to grant privileges to
subjects for the exclusive use of Crown property.7 ° Accordingly, certain
printers who were in favor with the Crown were granted the exclusive
right to print specified materials such as Bibles and service books,
statutes and proclamations, law books and almanacs based upon a
property right.7
Although the Royal Prerogative was based on a property right
vested in the Crown, it did not apparently vest in the recipient a fee
simple absolute. Rather, it seems to be akin to a fee simple conditional;
conditioned upon the pleasure of the Crown. For example, in 1553
Queen Mary I took away from the Queen's Printer the privilege to print
books of common law and gave it to one Richard Tottel, an established
printer of law books.72 Consequently, it does not appear that printers in
this period held an absolute property right to make copies. As with
many property rights, there were exceptions for numerous reasons.
The system of regulation of printed matter by Royal Prerogative
assumed a dual track when in 1556 the Stationers' Company was
granted its charter.73 The Stationers' Company, a guild established
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 91-96; RICHARD DEACON, WILLIAM CAXTON 126 (1976).
DEACON, supra note 65, at 126.
Id.
See 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c.3 (1554) (Eng.).
69. FEATHER, supra note 63, at 11.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 11-14; Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 208-09 (K.B. 1769).
72. FEATHER, supra note 63, at 12.
73. E.P. SKONE JAMES ET AL., COPINGER AND SKONE ON COPYRIGHT 4 (13th ed. 1991)
[hereinafter COPINGER]; W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE
MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 339 (4th ed. 1999); HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF
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around 1357, 74 desired an exclusive right to print for their members to
protect their investment. The Crown saw this granting of an exclusive
right as useful to co-opt the Stationers' Company into serving the
Crown's interest in censorship.75 Under Queen Mary,76 the Stationers'
Company was granted a virtual monopoly over the printing and
bookselling trade. 7 This was expanded under the reign of Queen
Elizabeth J.78 In essence, no one was allowed to print or sell a book
unless it was properly registered with the Stationers' Company. 79 To be
registered, the book must have been licensed as fit and could not
infringe on any other person's right in the copy of the book." However,
no one could register a book if a Royal Prerogative had already granted
an exclusive right to print and sell that book.8'
The Stationers' Company oversaw this dual regulatory system of
Royal Prerogatives and licensed books until 1590, at which time most
of the Royal Prerogatives were transferred to English stock and the
shares distributed amongst the members of the Stationers' Company.82
This English stock would later become quite valuable and a major
concern for the Stationers' Company.83
While little is written regarding the Stationers' Company during the
first half of the seventeenth century, it does appear that rights in copy
were bought, sold, inherited and used as security during this time thus
adding to and reinforcing the belief that the right to copy was a property
right.8 4 But social attitudes were changing with respect to a perpetual
monopoly right. In 1623, the Monopolies Act was passed limiting, for a
term of years, the exclusive right to a monopoly with respect to an
invention. 5 However, letters patents, or grants of privilege regarding
19 (2d ed. 1995).
74. LADDIE ET AL., supra note 73, at 19.
75. FEATHER, supra note 63, at 15; CORNISH, supra note 73, at 339; LADDIE ET AL., supra
note 73, at 20-22.
76. Reign Oct. 1, 1553 to Nov. 17, 1558.
77. FEATHER, supra note 63, at 15; CORNISH, supra note 73, at 339; LADDIE ET AL., supra
note 73, at 20-22.
78. FEATHER, supra note 63, at 15; CORNISH, supra note 73, at 339; LADDIE ET AL., supra
note 73, at 20-22.
79. FEATHER, supra note 63, at 15; CORNISH, supra note 73, at 339; LADDIE ET AL., supra
note 73, at 20-22.
80. FEATHER, supra note 63, at 15.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 24-25.
83. Id.
84. Indeed, this treatment of rights in copies seems to be traced back as far as 1563. See id.
at 17-34.
85. 21 Jac., c.3 (1623) (Eng.).
COPYRIGHT AND DESIGN
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printing, past, present or future, were specifically excluded from the
act. 86 The granting of Royal Prerogatives for the exclusive right to print
and disseminate specified written materials continued in the 1600s. 87
Political difficulties between the Crown and Parliament became the
focus of events under the reign of Charles 1 (1624-1649), culminating in
a civil war.88 In the battle for power between Charles I and Parliament
both sides recognized the power of the press. At this time political
pamphlets were being printed and distributed to spread the propaganda
of the various factions and incite disruption. 9 In 1637, the infamous
Star Chamber issued a decree confirming the authority of the
Stationers' Company to regulate the press in an attempt to stem the flow
of unlicensed information.90 This is one of the last recorded acts we
have regarding the Star Chamber's decrees in matters of printing
because the Star Chamber was abolished in 1640." 1
After the Star Chamber was abolished there was chaos in the
printing trade. Both sides during the civil war (1642-5 1) were focusing
on control of the press, but the Stationers' Company was ill equipped to
enforce censorship let alone alleged property rights during this period. 92
Parliament, in an attempt to regain some control over the printed word
issued an order in January 1642 that the author of a written work must
be acknowledged by name before the work could be printed and sold.93
This ordinance was not so much a predecessor to the moral right of
attribution as it was an attempt to identify and hold accountable authors
of scandalous works.94 But, as we are experiencing today with the
Internet, the genie was out of the bottle. For over a year the public was
experiencing an unregulated press. Inexpensive information,
particularly regarding political events, was being disseminated in vast
quantities. 95
In 1643 Parliament again attempted to regulate the press with a
licensing act. But there was resistance to the 1643 licensing act. For
example, the poet John Milton attempted to dissuade Parliament from
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. § X.
FEATHER, supra, note 63, at 38-39.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 35; Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 206-07.
16 Car., c. 10 (1640); COPINGER, supra note 73, at 5; Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 207; 2
HENRY HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 333 (1863) (discussing the Star
Chamber cases of Leighton, Lilburne and Prynne.).
92. FEATHER, supra, note 63, at 40.
93. Id.
94. Id.; Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 207.
95. ROBERT BIRLEY, PRINTING AND DEMOCRACY 7-21 (1964).
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such an act with his work Areopagitica written in 1643. As with many
earlier government attempts to censor the press, the 1643 licensing act
professed to be for the "public service."96 Milton questioned the validity
of this by pointing out that it was in the public service to have a press
free of licensing requirements.97 In Milton's Areopagitica, we see
support for the notion of a property interest for the holder of a right to
copy and a plea for a press free from prior restraint to encourage the
advancement of education in the name of the public good.9 8 While this
may not be the first example of the notion of a property right in
expressions and their copy, Milton inspired subsequent emissaries of
such rights, including John Locke. 99 Unfortunately, Milton did not
inspire Parliament, which did not reverse its licensing act and, indeed,
issued another licensing act in 1649.1"'
The Commonwealth period (1649-1660) does not appear to have
much legal action of note regarding the printing trade. Cromwell's
10
military rule has been described as being more akin to a dictatorship, '
and does not seem to have been popular nor conducive to the free
expression of the printed word. When Cromwell died in 1658, his son,
Richard, attempted to carry on as Lord Protector but the rule of
Cromwell proved so unpopular that the son of King Charles I, Charles
II, was restored to the throne in 1660.2 This historical period, known
as the Restoration, saw the return of licensing laws with regard to
printing.1 3 In 1662, another licensing act was passed which, again,
required a book to be approved by Crown censors prior to publication
and renewed the Stationer's Company search and seizure powers."
However, this attempt to control the printed word does not seem to have
been very successful as it appears that only around one half of the
political pamphlets distributed during the Restoration period were ever
licensed.0 5 Still, the licensing act was in force and renewed in 1664.6
Some interesting case law also begins to develop in the 1660s,
specifically with regard to the granting of Royal Prerogatives. In
96. MILTON, supranote 50.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See generally BENAMIN RAND, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE AND EDWARD

CLARKE (1927).
100. See Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 207.
101. 1 LORD MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 93-97 (Heron 1967).

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 14 Car. 2, c.33 (1662) (Eng.).
105. BIRLEY, supra note 95, at 21.

106. 16 Car. 2, c. 7 (1664) (Eng.).
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Stationers v. Patentees.10 7 Parliament held, amongst other things, that
the right over the copying and dissemination of a book was a property
right especially if the right was granted by Royal Prerogative.' °8 In
Stationers v. Seymour, the court found in favor of the holders of a
patent, this time the Stationers' Company, and in so doing asserted a
property right. '9
The licensing act lapsed in 1679,10 and it was not renewed until
1685."' During this period the Stationers' Company had no search and
seizure powers and no ability to obtain injunctions. Stationers' had only
common law rights, which were inadequate." 2 Accordingly, the
Stationers Company petitioned Parliament to renew the licensing act,
ostensibly to protect the public from a licentious press." 3 However, the
Stationers Company's paternalistic approach regarding the licentious
press was countered by a renewal of Milton's argument for a free press
by advocates such as Charles Blount, who wrote A Just Vindication of
Learning and the Liberty of the Press.114 In this thesis, Blount expressed
his belief that there was some property right in the right to copy."15
The battle over the licensing act continued for several more years with
the act being renewed in 1685,116 and again in 1692,"' but finally
expired in 1694.'18 The end of the licensing act caused concern in the
printing and bookselling trade. It was difficult to enforce registration of
books to determine property rights without a statutory requirement.
Hence, the Stationers' Company again lobbied Parliament to reinstate
the licensing act, again arguing that it was for the public good but

107.
108.
109.
110.
at 340.
111.
112.
113.

124 Eng. Rep. 842 (1666).
Id. at 842-43.
86 Eng. Rep. 865 (1667).
FEATHER, supra note 63, at 48; COPINGER, supra note 73, at 6; CORNISH, supra note 73,
1 Jac. 2, c.17 (1685) (Eng.).
COPINGER, supra note 73, at 7; CORNISH, supra note 73, at 340.

FEATHER, supra, note 63, at 49.

114. CHARLES BLOUNT, A JUST VINDICATION OF LEARNING AND THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS,
reprintedin BRITISH PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGIANS OF THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES, at 3

(Rend Wellek ed., Garland Press 1979) (1695). Some have accused Blount of plagiarism from
Milton's Arepagitica.See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT

32 (1993). Having read both, it is my belief that Blount rephrased the tedious prose, which had little
effect on Parliament, to make a coherent and sharp argument that did have some effect on
Parliament. Further, Blount did acknowledge Milton. BLOUNT, supra, at 4.
115. BLOUNT, supranote 114, at23.
116. 1 Jac. 2, c. 7 (1685) (Eng.)
117. 4 W. & M., c. 24, § 14 (1692) (Eng.).
118. Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 209.
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undoubtedly the Stationers' Company wanted to protect what it had
come to view as, and treat like, a property right.
In 1694 sentiment seems to have been opposed to the renewal
despite the Stationers' Company support on the grounds that it was
necessary to restore order to the trade. With a law on the books similar
to the licensing act the Stationers' Company had the ability to control
printing through coercive measures. With no such law, people could
print with impunity. John Locke wrote against renewal of the licensing
act invoking Milton's Areopagitica, however, Locke's prose was much
more pragmatic and has been given some credit in persuading
Parliament against renewing the licensing act.' 19
Locke was against the prior restraint aspect of the licensing act
arguing that the terms were much too "general and comprehensive."' 2 °
Additionally, Locke had particularly strong sentiments regarding the
granting of Royal Prerogatives creating monopolies in certain books.
On that issue he argued against the practice on the basis that
competition creates a better quality work at a lower cost but Locke
conceded that some limited term of years for the exclusive right to copy
ought to be granted. 1 ' On this subject Locke writes in a prose that is
easily understood in any age:
That any person or company should have patents for the
sole printing of ancient authors is very unreasonable and
injurious to learning; and for those who purchase copies
from authors that now live and write, it may be
reasonable to limit their property to a certain number of
years after the death of the author, or the first printing of
the book, as, suppose, fifty or seventy years.'22
Thus, while Locke recognized some property right in the right to copy
books he clearly thought such rights needed to be limited to living
authors for a term of years.'23
Undeterred, the Stationers' Company continued to advance the
cause of renewal of the licensing act from 1695 until the passage of the
Statute of Anne in 1709 but the appeal for a free press to promote
education garnered more support than cries to restrict a licentious press.
In support of the free press position were authors such as Daniel Defoe
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

ROSE, supra note 114, at 44, 47.
LORDKING, THE LWFE AND LETTERSOF JOHN LOCKE 203 (London: HenryG. Bohn 1858).

Id.
Id. at 208.
Id.
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who, in 1704, wrote a paper entitled: An Essay on the Regulation of the
Press again arguing in favor of a free press and against any attempt to
re-enact a prior restraint licensing act.'2 4 In this essay, Defoe carried on
with the argument that seemed to be working; the need for a free press
for the encouragement of learning in the public interest. However,
Defoe also addressed the property rights of authors:
[Piracy of expression] is really a most injurious piece of
Violence, and a Grievance to all Mankind; for it not only
robs their Neighbor of their just Right, but it robs Men of
the Prize of Learning, and
the due Reward of Industry,
12
the Benefit of their Studies; 1
This is the first Sort of the Press-Piracy, the next is
pirating Books in smaller Print, and meaner Paper, in
order to sell them lower than the first impression. Thus
as soon as a Book is publish'd by the Author, a rascally
Fellow buys it, and immediately falls to work upon it, ...
to sell... a Book of three Shillings for one Shilling, a
Pamphlet of a Shilling, for 2 d. a Six-penny Book in a
penny sheet, and the like. This is down-right robbing on
the High-way or cutting a Purse ....
The Law we are upon, effectually suppresses this most
villainous Practice, for every Author being oblige'd to
set his Name to the Book he writes, has, by this Law, an
undoubted exclusive Right to the Property of it. The
Clause in the Law is a Patent to the Author, and settles
the Propriety of the Work wholly in himself, or in such
to whom he shall assign it; and 'tis reasonable it should
be so: For if an Author has not the right of a Book, after
he has made it, and the benefit be not his own, and the
be very
Law will not protect him in that Benefit, 'twould 126
hard the Law should pretend to punish him for it.
As with Blount and Locke before him, Defoe recognized a property
right in the expression and the making of copies; however, he clarified
the author's property right, which could be assigned.
124. Daniel Defoe, An Essay on the Regulation of the Press (1704), available at
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/-rbear/defoe2.htm.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 20-21.
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The Stationers' Company seemed to realize that it was getting
nowhere with its old cries for prior restraint censorship based upon the
licentious press so it changed strategies and took up the cause
advocated by Defoe - to protect the author's property rights.'27 Several
more attempts to get a bill passed through Parliament were made with
this change in strategy starting in 1707. The window dressing of
protecting the author and advancing learning was added but some
attempts were still made to include a prior restraint licensing clause.
These attempts were unsuccessful so the licensing clause was dropped
and the first copyright statute finally passed in 17092 8 and with it the
concept of a limited property right for a term of years.1
Il. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES ADDRESSING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
EXPRESSIONS AND THEIR REPRODUCTION

Western history suggests a belief in a possessory interest maturing
into a property right for creative expressions and reproductions, but
why? Is it human nature or culture that defines property? To understand
the basis of "mine" relating to expressions, we need to explore the
philosophical basis of a property right in general because many
copyright cases seem to rely upon philosophical theories for
justification of the end result.129 This seemingly simple task has
confounded and confused philosophers for thousands of years.
Fortunately, such confusion has not stopped them from expounding
upon the subject providing us with a vast variety of divergent thought
on this issue in a cornucopia of material that surely must have subjected
its authors to Dante's eighth circle of hell. 3°
The most prominent legal philosophies justifying a property right in
the right to reproduce a creation are the natural law, personality, and
utilitarian philosophies. While the subsections below examine each
philosophical theory in an isolated fashion, the practical reality is that
both domestic and international intellectual property law tend to
resemble more of a blended than a single malt philosophy.

127. ROSE, supranote 114, at 35-36.
128. 8 Ann., c. 19(1710)(Eng.).
129. See Elder, 537 U.S. at 212; id. at 245-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Mazer, 347 U.S. at 206
n.5; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50.
130. The eighth circle ofhell is described in Canto XVIII ofDante's Inferno. See DANTE, THE
INFERNO 195 (Elanor Vinton Murray tr., 1920), availableat http://books.google.com/books?id=
qnVMJNbFtuMC.
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A. The NaturalLaw Theory
The natural law theory as a justification of property ownership is
perhaps the most familiar theory. Locke's fruits-of-their-labor theory
appears to be one of the philosophical justifications relied upon by the
U.S. Congress in enacting and amending copyright legislation. 3
Additionally, U.S. Supreme Court decisions'32 and legal scholarship
regarding U.S. copyright law indicates a prevalent belief that natural
law is the best applicable regarding copyright.' 33
The natural law theory justifying property rights can be traced back
to at least the ancient Greek philosophers. Aristotle described the art of
acquiring property as part of household management; with the function
of the latter to properly use the former.'34 Aristotle believed that
property given for subsistence was natural, but hoarding was not. 3
Still, according to Aristotle, private ownership was desirable, given the
human nature to quarrel over objects.' 36 In Aristotelian philosophy and
in Platonic philosophy, the existence of property rights are taken as a
given; thus, the discussion 37revolves around what property is, rather than
the basis for its existence.
Economic justification for creating a property right in the first
copyright statute was initially premised on the natural law, Lockean
fruits-of-their-labor concept. 13 The theory rested, in part, on the belief
that productivity is increased through ownership and the emotional
appeal, as expressed by Blackstone in the Millar case, that ownership
131. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights:LiteraryPropertyin RevolutionaryFrance
andAmerica,64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1000-02 (1990) (collecting sources); see also L. Ray Patterson
& Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyright
Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution,52 EMORY
L.J. 909, 931-32 (2003).
132. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,346 (1991); Mazer, 347 U.S.
at 207 n.5; Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 264 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82,94 (1879); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591,658,
690-91 (1834).
133. Wendy Gordon, A PropertyRight in Self-Expression:Equality andindividualism in the
NaturalLaw ofIntellectualProperty, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993); see also Orit Fischman
Afori, Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of Natural Law Considerations Into
American Copyright, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497 (2004).
134. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1256a, § 1, at 19 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1979).
135. Id. at20-23.
136. Id. at48-49.
137. WILIAM BARRETr, IRRATIONAL MAN: A STUDY IN EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY 85-86
(Penguin Books 1958).
138. Linda J. Lacy, OfBreadandRoses andCopyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1539 (1989);
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1966) (1689).
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was just. 3 9 However, application of this property theory in its pure form
proved to be problematic from both a philosophical as well as a
practical stand point.
Philosophically, Locke did not extend his theories on tangible
property to intellectual property. Indeed, he advocated term limits for
copyright, a significant departure from tangible property rights. 4 ' Even
with tangible property, Locke believed that property should not be
wasted, and that the appropriation of property by one should not harm
others in society. 4 ' These conditions also exemplify the fact that
Locke's "fruits-of-their-labor" theory was primarily concerned with
avoiding what he perceived as
the waste of rivalrous resources due to
14 2
the tragedy of the commons.

From an economic standpoint, the natural law theory has not proven
to be sound for intellectual property. Prior to the enactment of the
Statute of Anne, the right to copy creative works was treated as a
perpetual right as such rights would be treated under the natural law
theory. And, as history teaches us, this resulted in less-than-desirable
quality and quantity which, in part, stimulated the need for change.'43
B. The Personality Theory
We see historical hints of the personality theory going back to
ancient times, e.g., with Martial, the Roman epigramist discussed
above.'" Despite this ancient heritage, some scholars trace this
philosophical theory to Immanuel Kant.'45 Under Kant's personality
theory, the artist's creation is infused with the artist's personality and,
thus, something more than property and deserving protection under the

139. Lacy, supranote 138, at 1539-40; Millar,98 Eng. Rep. at 209.
140. KING, supra note 120, at 208.
141. Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights andResponsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV.
135, 179 (2004).
142. Id.
143. See supra Part II.C.2.
144. See supraPart II.B.I.
145. Lacy, supranote 138, at 1541-42;see EMANUELKANT, Of the Injustice in Counterfeiting
Books, in ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, PoLmIcAL, AND VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS
227, 229-30 (William Richardson trans., 1798), availableat http://books.google.com/books?id=
eZYn5EYifGoC. At the time Kant wrote this essay developing his philosophy relating to
intellectual property, his own books were selling better and subject to counterfeiting, a fact that may
indicate some material self-interest in the matter. MANFRED KUEHN, KANT: A BIOGRAPHY 294-95
(2001); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 962
(1982); Martin A. Roeder, The DoctrineofMoralRight:A Study in the Law ofArtists, Authors and
Creators, 53 HARv. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940).
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law.146 Kant believed that property rights could and should be allowed
under positive law.' 47 For Kant, natural law was not applicable to
property rights because natural law only applied to innate rights in
one's own person, that which internally is "mine. 14 8 Property, that
which externally is "mine," stems from the unilateral act of first
acquisition to establish the provisional right that is subsequently ratified
by the state, not the state of nature, providing institutional coercive
powers. 149 Because creative expressions are created not acquired by the
creator, property law did not seem to fit. 150 For Kant, a creative
expression was a personality right vested in the author who could assign
to an agent the right to sell the expression. 5 '
Kant's personality theory would seem to contrast with his definition
of moral law which, according to Kant, is based upon pure reason and
universalism, a categorical imperative.' 52 As we see in history as well as
philosophy and social psychology there is no universal belief as to
intellectual property laws. Some believed that intellectual property law
reflects natural law, while others believe intellectual property law is
utilitarian. Indeed, many states did not even have intellectual property
laws until required to do so under the World Trade Organization
treaties. 5 3 Most intellectual property laws seem to reflect a view that
the material interest aspect of intellectual property laws are an
economic incentive to create more, i.e., a means to an end, or a
hypothetical imperative, according to Kant.'54 The notion that a creative
expression is infused with the personality of the creator is reflected in

146. Roeder, supra note 145, at 557.
147. See Emanuel Kant, Groundworkof the Metaphysics ofMorals,in ESSAYS ANDTREATISES
ON MORAL, POLTICAL, AND VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 59-60 (William Richardson trans.,

1798), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=eZYn5EYifGoC; Marcus Verhaegh, Kant
and PropertyRights, 18(3) J.LIBERTARIAN STUD. 11 (2004).
148. See supranote 147.
149. See supranote 147.
150. See supranote 147.
151. See supranote 147.
152. A categorical imperative is an action that is necessary in itself. It is not based on another
interest but is universal and good in and of itself. Contrast this with the hypothetical imperative
which allows practical necessity as a possible justification for action. Simply put, in the
hypothetical imperative the end justifies the means, while the categorical imperative requires that
the means be good in and of themselves. See KANT, supra note 147, at 59-60.
153. Robert J.Gutowski, The Marriageof IntellectualPropertyand InternationalTrade in
the TRIPs Agreement: StrangeBedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven? 47 BUFF. L. REv. 713,
717-18 (1999).
154. KANT, supranote 147, at 59.
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moral 55rights found in some, but certainly not all, intellectual property
laws. 1
For example, the United States did not include moral rights as part
of its statutory copyright protection until 1989 when it was obliged to
do so upon the ratification of the Berne Convention. 56 Accordingly,
there is little U.S. federal law addressing a personality legal philosophy
regarding copyright.'57 However, state law in the United States is not
devoid of such protections. In California, the Art Preservation Act
recognizes certain rights of personality creators may have in a
creation. 5 8 Further, although "moral rights" were not recognized as
such under U.S. federal law prior to the ratification of the Berne
Convention, some case law provided protection to an author's
personality interests under various tort and trademark theories. 59 That
said, scholarship in the United States has indicated a lack of universality
regarding domestic moral rights under a personality theory. 6 °
C. UtilitarianPhilosophy
The utilitarian philosophy views intellectual property laws as a
legislatively created means to an end. This theory is reflected in the
works of Hegel and Hohfeld.' 6' Hegel did not view property nor
155. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformationof MoralRights, 55 AM. J. CoMp.
L. 67, 74-75 (2007); Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, ProtectingMoral Rights in the United
States andthe UnitedKingdom:Challengesand OpportunitiesUnderthe U.K.'s New Performances
Regulations, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 213, 218-20 (2006).
156. Rigamonti, supra note 155, at 77.
157. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1995).
158. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2008); see also Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the
Amoral Copyright: A Comparison ofArtists' Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 2 (1980) (discussing the Art Preservation Act).
159. See generally Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976); see
also Big Seven Music Corp. v. Lennon, 554 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1977).
160. See generally Clint A. Carpenter, Stepmother, May I?: Moral Rights, Dastar,and the
False Advertising Prong of Lanham Act Section 43(A), 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1601, 1607
(2006); Kimberly Y. W. Hoist, A Case of Bad Credit?: The United States and the Protectionof
MoralRights in IntellectualPropertyLaw, 3 BuFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105, 107 (2006); Susan P.
Liemer, How We Lost Our Moral Rights and the Door Closed on Non-Economic Values in
Copyright, 5 J. MARSHALL REv. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 2 (2005); Sarah Kutner & Holly Rich, Dirty
Dancing:Attributing the Moral Right ofAttribution to American Copyright Law. The Work For
Hire Doctrine and the Usurping of the Ultimate GrandDame and Founder of Modern Dance,
Martha Graham, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 325, 344-50 (2004).
161. See GEORG HEGEL, The PhilosophyofRight andLaw, in THE PHILOSOPHY OFHEGEL 221,
280-84 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., J.M. Sterret trans., Modem Library 1954) (1821); WesleyNewcomb
Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning,23 YALE L.J.
16, 20-25 (1913).
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intellectual property in terms of natural law. 162 To Hegel, the state of
nature was chaotic and lacked freedom. 163 To achieve freedom,
humanity needed civil society." 4 Hegel theorized that freedom is best
obtained through intersubjective relations in civil society. 65 Property
enhances intersubjective relations through recognition of rights in
positive law, not natural law.' 66 Simply put, people need recognition by
other people. Legal rights in objects allows this recognition. 167 Objects
are merely a means to obtain recognition. 68 Accordingly, the rationality
of property is derived from the human need for recognition. Civil
society may or may not enact intellectual property laws or other types
of property laws to meet this need. In essence, Hegel saw various types
169
of property laws as permissive, but not required.
The Hohfeldian theory, 7 ' based on the works of Hume and
Bentham, that property rights are a collection of rights that establish the
legal relationship between the property holder and the world at large is
a further refinement of the utilitarian theory that property is a means to
an end.17 ' Under this theory, copyright is legislatively created to serve
the interests of the public, and not just the creator. 7 2 The public and
creator are served through intersubjective relations. The existence of the
object is not personified; rather it is utilized for personal or social
purposes. Accordingly, the essence of property is merely a human
conceived tool fashioned to meet social needs and, thus, cannot be
universal.
Again, U.S. intellectual property law provides an example of this
philosophical theory. The Constitution itself describes the basic
objective as one of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science,"' 7 3 i.e.,
knowledge and learning. The Clause exists not to "provide a special
private benefit,"' 74 but "to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
162. HEGEL, supranote 161, at 241-5 1; Jeanne L. Schroeder, UnnaturalRights: Hegel and
Intellectual Property,60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 453,454, 457 (2006).
163. HEGEL, supra note 161, at 245; see also Schroeder, supra note 162, at 454.
164. HEGEL, supra note 161, at 228.
165. Id.at 241-42; see also Schroeder, supra note 162, at 490-91.
166. HEGEL, supranote 161, at 243, 275; see also Schroeder, supra note 162, at 461,464.
167. According to Hegel, "the rationality of property does not lie in its satisfaction of wants,
but in its abrogation of the mere subjectivity of personality". HEGEL, supra note 161, at 241.
168. Id. at 246.
169. Id.at 244.
170. Hohfeld, supra note 161, at 20-25.
171. Lacy, supra note 138, at 1544, 1567.
172. Id at 1540-41.

173. U.S. CONST. art.1, §8, cl.
8.
174. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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public good."' 7 5 It does so by "motivat[ing] the creative activity of
authors" through "the provision of a special reward."' 76 The "reward" is
a means, not an end. And that is why the copyright term is limited. It is
limited so that its beneficiaries--the public-"will not be permanently
deprived of the fruits of an artist's labors.""' Thus, the utilitarian goal
is achieved by natural law, fruits-of-their-labor, permitting authors to
reap the rewards of their creative efforts.' 78 So, while the individual
creator may have other philosophical notions, U.S. copyright law
recognizes the property right as a means to an end.
IV. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REGARDING A PROPERTY RIGHT IN
CREATIVE EXPRESSIONS AND THEIR REPRODUCTION

Western history evidences a possessory interest claimed by creators
to expressions and, to some degree, recognition by Western society to
such a claim.' 79 This recognized and socially acceptable claim of
"mine" is the foundation for the legal property right found in most
Western states' domestic copyright law. 8° Philosophical discourse has
attempted to justify property in general, and intellectual property in
specific, through both positive and normative analysis. But still we are
vexed with a lack of consensus regarding why some states accepted the
claim of "mine" regarding expression and their copy as a legal property
right, while others did not. Some attempts to answer the difficult
question of why states embrace property law are found in social

175. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
176. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
177. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990); see also Harper & Row, Publishers v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985) ("[C]opyright is intended to increase and not to impede
the harvest of knowledge"); Sony, 464 U. S. at 429 ("[L]imited grant" is "intended... to allow the
public access to the products of [authors'] genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired"); Mazer, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("[C]opyright law... makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration") (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a FairUse Standard,103 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990).
179. At around the same time the issue of a property right in intellectual property was being
explored in England, similar issues were being addressed in France, see, e.g., GILLIAN DAVIES,
COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 73-95 (IIC Studies in Indus. Prop. & Copyright Law, Vol.
14, 1994); Ginsburg, supra note 131 at 995-97, and Venice, Italy, see 2 GEORGE H. PUTNAM,
BOOKS AND THEIR MAKERS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 342-44.
180. ARISTOTLE, supra note 134, at 2-3; THOMAS HOBBES, De Cive, in MAN AND CITIZEN (DE

HOMINE AND DE CIVE) 117, 125 (Bernard Gert ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1991) (1642); JEANJACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUAITY 44 (Donald A. Cress trans.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1992) (1755).
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psychology. While thought provoking, these purported answers are by
nature speculative and ever changing.
If we were to address the concept of "mine" from a social
psychological perspective, questions arise such as why some creators
believe they have a possessory interest or property right in expressions?
Why do copyright holders believe they are entitled to a possessory
interest in the dissemination of creative works? And why do some
believe that creative works belong in the public domain with little to no
possessory interests? To some extent the desire to have a possessory
interest in creative works and their copy is based upon economics. This
economic incentive may be explained by social psychology as part of a
desire to acquire. A great deal of research has been conducted by social
psychologists as to the impetus behind the desire to acquire material
possessions, but no research seems to have been conducted with regard
to the desire to acquire an intangible right such as copyright. Still, the
research conducted regarding material possessions may be applicable
by analogy to intangibles, such as copyright.
The first social psychology theory that may provide an
understanding of this claim of "mine" is biological instinct. A popular
early social psychological theory was that humans acquired material
objects because of an acquisitive, biological instinct." Such an
acquisitive instinct would be supported by most economic theories
regarding copyright as the ability to economically exploit one's creative
works; theoretically, the economic incentive manifests itself in more
productivity.'82 Further, the acquisitive theory in social psychology
regarding material possessions is analogous to the ability to
economically provide a mechanism to acquire more material
possessions.'83
Dissatisfied with the instinct theory, some social psychologists
explored a personality theory behind the concept of "mine." Thus, a
Kantian personification of the object links the person to the object as a
form of external and internal expression.' Perhaps humans desire to
have a possessory interest in creative works due to a need to extend
oneself through the creative work. Such an extension of self theory
181. HELGA DITrMAR, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MATERIAL POSSESSIONS: To HAVE IS TO
BE 20-26 (1992).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Lacy, supranote 138, at 1541-42; see Emanuel Kant, Of the Injustice in Counterfeiting
Books, in ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POITICAL, AND VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS
227, 229-30 (William Richardson trans., 1798), availableat http://books.google.comfbooks?id=
eZYn5EYifGoC.
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seems to be supported by the right to attribution contained in many
copyright laws.' 85 This theory would seem to explain, in part, the
historical development of copyright law, especially in the pre-copyright
law period. However, such a theory does not sufficiently explain the
motivation of disseminators seeking payment for dissemination of
copies of material that they claim to be their property. This may be
explained as a desire by disseminators to control copies in order to
increase their profit, which indirectly leads to an ability to acquire and
extend themselves through their material possessions.
Finally, this section examines the social constructionist view of
possessions. Under this theory, possessions are a socially shared symbol
of rules, beliefs and understandings. While objects are not tied to the
person as an extension of personality, they are a means of
communicating social perceptions. For example, in some cultures value
is placed on individual success that, to some extent, is measured by
material wealth. In such cultures the creator may seek and gain fame,
thus providing the motive for attribution and dissemination. The
disseminators may desire to enhance their ability to acquire and fame to
enhance their reputation, leading to more ability to acquire.
A. BiologicalInstinct: The Selfish Gene
To address the theory of biological instinct we must first define
what we mean by instinct. Although various definitions of "instinct"
exist, for purposes of this paper I consider instinct to mean an unlearned
tendency or disposition of a species to respond in a particular manner. 6
Within the framework of this definition of instinct we next ask if there
is an acquisitive biological instinct in humans? If so, this must mean
that such an instinct is universal and would, therefore, cross cultures
because it is unlearned and, hence, not influenced by external factors.
Most social psychologist accept that there is a basic level of instinct
to acquire necessities to survive.8 7 Some philosophers addressing
property law have postulated that the acquisitive instinct goes beyond
acquiring necessities amounting to hoarding behavior and explains why
humans seek society.'88 This societal inclination is part of humanity's
natural inclination of selfishness and limited generosity as humans gain
more of that which they seek in society.' 89 So humans in the state of
185. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C § 106A.
186. DITTMAR, supra note 181, at 22.
187. Id. at 20.
188. Id. at 26.
189. DAvID HuME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 266-67 (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds.,
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1898) (1874), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=
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nature have at the very least a natural inclination to acquire the
necessities such as food and shelter19 ° and perhaps as much as a
hoarding instinct or the "selfish gene.""19
The notion that there was an acquisitive instinct to possess more
than just the necessities of life was a popular notion in the seventeenth
to early twentieth centuries and influenced philosophical debate
regarding property. For example, the work of Descartes and Hobbes on
this subject influenced Locke and his labor theory of property.' 92 This
belief that acquisition was instinctual was so widely believed that
phrenologists held that acquisitiveness was neurological,' 93 and
psychologists accepted the desire to acquire and hoard property as
instinctive. 94
If we accede to the instinct theory for the acquisition and hoarding
of material possessions we can extend that theory to the desire to
possess intangibles. As we have seen above, this extension of
possessory interests in intangibles was recognized in ancient Rome.'
For creators there are several property interests involved such as the
primary impulse of possession of the creation itself and the secondary
intangible property interests such the right to control the copying and
dissemination to obtain the means to acquire.
But what about moral rights or, more specifically, attribution? After
the creator has sold her creation, is there any reason why she should
have a lingering right to maintain that she was the creator and no one
else? For purposes of social psychology, is there an instinct impulse that
compels the creator to demand attribution? The primary impulse of
ownership is gone as far as the creation itself is concerned, but the
secondary impulse of obtaining the means by which to acquire more in
the future may still exist. Attribution has a value in reputation, which
may lead to further demand for the creator's works. This would enhance
the creator's ability to exchange her creations for other tangible objects.

BWWjkWuuxsQC.
190. ERNEST BEAGLEHOLE, PROPERTY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 17. Additional broad

categories of instincts that are generally accepted include those relating to self-maintenance, selfperpetuation, and self-gratification. Id.at 156.
191. DrTTMAR, supra note 181, at 26.
192. See Floyd Webster Rudmin, The Economic Psychology OfLeon Litwinski, 11 J. ECON.
PSYCH.307, 311.

193. Id.at 314 (noting that the phrenologist Johann Spurzheim considered acquisitiveness to
be controlled by the temporal lobe).
194. Id.
195. See supraPart II.B.1.
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impulse, which serves to
Accordingly, there may be a 1secondary
96
explain the desire for attribution.
The right to control the copying and dissemination of a creation is
the intangible right provided by copyright.' 97 If there is any instinct
impulse that forms a basis for creators to assert this right it is a
secondary impulse. As with attribution, the ability to claim a lingering
possessory interest over the creation in terms of who may make copies
provides the creator with some control over the quality of the copies,
which may serve to protect reputation. It also provides the creator with
an income flow to obtain material possessions. This is not to say that
the concept of copyright is itself an instinctual concept. Rather, it is
what copyright represents in terms of the ability to acquire material
possessions that is instinctual.
The pure instinct theory has come under attack and has been
supplemented or replaced by social psychologists who believe that
environment plays an even greater role in explaining the desire to
acquire. Additionally, there is the argument that the biological instinct
theory makes social inequalities appear natural and acceptable.' 9 While
such an argument may be politically correct, it attacks the biological
theory with an emotional appeal, not a logical appeal. The fact of the
matter is that there are some inherent tendencies in society for
inequality given the fact that societies are created by people and people
are by nature not equal. 9 9 While such natural inequalities are no
justification for socially created inequalities, an argument based on
politically correct rhetoric lays on a foundation liable to shift on a
moment's notice.
A better argument is that there is no scientific evidence to establish
an instinctual propensity for acquisitive behavior.2"0 While most social
psychologists agree that there is a basic instinct to acquire the
necessities of life,20 ' there is a dearth of evidence establishing an
instinct to hoard.20 2 Conversely, there is some social psychological
196. This motivation for attribution to enhance reputation, thus leading to a better ability to
acquire, is reflected in history, see supraPart II.B, and suggested in the utilitarian philosophy, see
infra Part IH.C.
197. 17 U.S.C. § 106; Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 9.
198. DrrAR, supranote 181, at21.
199. ARISTOTLE, supra note 134, at 11-14; JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIALCONTRACT
AND DISCOURSES 166-167 (G. D. H. Cole trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1923) (1761); RoussAEu, supra
note 180, at 23; SIGMuND FREUD, CIVIIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 42 (James Strachey trans.,

W.W. Norton & Co. 1961).
200. DrrrMAR, supra note 181, at 25-27, 36-39 (discussing genetic reductionism theory).
201. Id., at 26.
202. Id.
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evidence to establish that culture does play a role in acquisitive
behavior. 03 Further, a biological instinct theory for intellectual property
fails given the lack of universal behavior. Indeed, intellectual property
laws as conceived by Western states were pushed onto developing
states through international agreements such as Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual2°Property Rights (TRIPS) precisely because of this lack of
universalism.
Finally, there is the argument that a biological instinct to acquire
does not explain altruistic actions such as gift giving.0 5 However, pure
altruism has been criticized based upon ulterior motives such as
reciprocal altruism, 2° social responsibility 20 7 and kin protection. 2 ' Even
the more optimistic assessments of altruism, such as social exchanging,
external rewards, internal rewards, and empathy, 2 9 show a motivating
factor such as a desire to feel good or social recognition.
Accordingly, it seems counterproductive to adhere to a pure
instinctual reductionism or cultural reductionism position.2 0 While
instinct applied in the context of artistic creators may explain part of the
motive to create and disseminate, alternative social psychological
theories based upon cultural influences may prove more enlightening.
B. The PersonalityTheory: Personificationof Creationsas Justification
Fora PropertyRight in the Reproduction of Creations
Are our creations and material possessions a mechanism by which
we convey to others who we are? There are advocates in the field of
social psychology who espouse this theory. l Indeed, studies conducted
by social psychologists do establish a tie between personal possessions
and self esteem, which appears to cross cultural barriers.21 2 This section
will explore this personality theory view and its possible application to
the property right in copyright.

203. Id. at 39.
204. Gutowski, supra note 153, at 720.
205. DITTMAR, supra note 181, at 26-27.
206. Id. at 26; DAvID MYERS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 476 (7th ed. 2001).
207. MYERS, supra note 206, at 477.
208. Id. at 479.
209. Id. at471-73.
210. DrrTMAR, supranote 181, at37.
211. Id. at 43-65; BEAGLEHOLE, supranote 190, at 134-37; Marsha L. Richins & Floyd W.
Rudmin, Materialismand Economic Psychology, 15 J. ECON. PSYCH. 217 (1994).
212. DITTMAR, supra note 181, at 43,47; BEAGLEHOLE, supra note 190, at 134-37.
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1. Anthropological Studies
There have been numerous cross-cultural 2 3 studies that show a tie
between personal property and self esteem." 4 This can be gleaned from
some non-Western religions that evidence a tie between an object and
the spirit or part of the self.2 5 For example, in the religions of the
Maori, Eskimos, and Palaungs, objects were buried with the deceased
because the objects were deemed to be attached to the individual and so
would have no value to the community. 2 6 Further, it is believed by
some that the mixing of labor with land creates a psychological tie
between the person and land, similar to the tie between a person and a
work of art created by that person. 2 7 This tie between an object and a
person fulfills an expressive desire as well as that of self-esteem.
2. Tie Between Possessions and Self
Social psychologists and legal philosophers alike, at least in
Western cultures, have postulated that material possessions play a
profound role in the developments of self.21 8 Under this theory, the
utilitarianism. 219

psychological significance of possessions transcends
Possessions fulfill the expressive desire to describe to people who we

213. For purposes of this paper, culture is defined as a multi-layered, shared way of solving
dilemmas or processing ideas. Culture is created by myriad factors, including history, religion,
mythology, climate and geography of a country. Culture is defined by shared values and beliefs,
and forms the fundamental assumptions on which the whole society is built. Michael S. Schell &
Charlene Marmer Solomon, Global Orientation:InterculturalAwareness as a Core Business
Capability,in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCES GUIDE § 4:7 (Roger Herod ed., 2008).
214. BEAGLEHOLE, supranote 190, at 134; Floyd Webster Rudmin Cross-CulturalCorrelates
of the Ownership of PrivateProperty,21 Soc. ScI. RESEARCH 57, 71 (1992). However, there are
inherent uncertainties in cross-cultural studies, such as ethnographies. Such uncertainties stem from
the grouping of informed opinion, unknown bias, difficulties in interpreting correlation studies and
ethnographies in holocultural samples provided by 19th and 20th century research when people in
some cultures were being dispossessed ofproperty by Western culture, and difficulties arising from
West being in an ideological split over communism. See also Floyd Rudmin et al., Gustav Ichheiser
in the History of Social Psychology: An Early Phenomenology of Social Attribution, 26 BRIT. J.
SOC. PSYCH. 165, 170-71 (1987).
215. BEAGLEHOLE, supranote 190, at 134. The term "self" is defined as what one believes
about oneself. DrrMAR, supra note 181, at 73.
216. BEAGLEHOLE, supra note 190, at 136-37.
217. Id. at 146-49.
218. DrrMAR, supra note 181, at 56; Anita Bernstein, How Can a Product be Liable?, 45
DUKE L.J. 1, 17-18 (1995) (citing Hegel).
219. DrFrMAR, supranote 181, at 63.
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our perception of
are (external self expression),2 2 ° and to perpetuate
22
who we believe we are (internal self expression). '
With respect to the creator, if we accept the notion that acquisition
of material goods is an extension of self, how is that applicable to
copyright? The intangible right of copyright provides at least two
avenues of possessory interests with which to fulfill the need of
extension of self. The first avenue is that of attribution: to the call the
work "mine" allows the creator social recognition, the external selfexpression.2 Additionally, the psychological phenomenon of enhanced
self-esteem and internal self-expression is cultivated through the
godlike process of creating.223 The second avenue is through control of
copying and dissemination to obtain the means to acquire additional
material possessions for the purpose of expression.224 These qualities
should not be underestimated. Psychological data indicates that selfesteem through both external and internal self-expression is beneficial
for psychological well-being. 25
Critics of this personality theory argue that it personifies the
object.226 Still, personality theory is a common theory advanced to
justify a property right in copyright premised on moral rights.22 7 As
discussed above, this theory is based, in part, on the works of Kant2.
and holds that intellectual property works are the "embodiment of
'
personality."229
C. Social Constructionists
The social constructionists view the world as perceived in terms of a
socially shared, common underlying symbolic order of rules, beliefs,

220. See id.at 62-63; Bernstein, supra note 218, at 18.
221. See Bernstein, supra note 218, at 18.
222. See DITTMAR, supra note 181, at 62-63; Bernstein, supra note 218, at 18.
223. See Lior Zemer, The Making ofa New CopyrightLockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y
891, 936-37 (2006); Ellen T. Harris, Integrity and Improvisation in the Music of Handel, 8 J.
MUSICOLOGY 301, 301-02 (1990).
224. DIrrMAR, supra note 181, at 43-65; BEAGLEHOLE, supra note 190, at 134-37; Richins
& Rudmin, supranote 211, at 217.
225. See FRANK J. LANDY, PsYCHoLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF PEOPLE 485-88 (1984); DAVID

775-89 (3d ed. 1974).
226. Schroeder, supra note 162, at 499-500.
227. Edward J. Damich, The Right ofPersonality:A Common-Law Basisfor the Protection
of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property,77 GEo L.J. 287, 288 (1988).
228. Lacy, supra note 138, at 1541-42; KANT, supra note 145, at 229-30.
229. Lacy, supra note 138, at 1541-42.
KRECH ET AL., ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
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and understandings.23 ° Under this theory, possessions represent socially
shared symbols for identity.23 ' Here, identity incorporates self; our
internal concepts of who we are, as well as an external expression of
how we want to be perceived by others and how others perceive us.
Possessions are utilized for this expression to establish one in a social
position. 2132 This theory has shades of Hegel's theory of intersubjective
relationships in civil society.233
Examples of the external communication of social position in
possessions may be seen in some literary examples, for instance, in
Shakespeare's Hamlet, Polonius says to Laertes:
Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy,
But not express'd in fancy; rich, not gaudy:
For the apparel oft proclaims the man;
And they in France of the best rank and station
Are of a most select and generous sheaf in that.2 34
The American author, James Agee, writes:
He was driving a several-years-old tan sedan, much the
sort of a car a factory worker in a northern city
drives .... 235
The women's and girls' clothes and those of the children
are made at home ... There are standard cloths, cheap
cotton prints mainly .... .1 am sure that Mrs. Gudger
feels intense social and perhaps 'spiritual' distinctions
between the kinds of cloth in their meanings .... In this
she differs from and is 'above' the 'normal,' as she is too
in the designing of the clothes, and in various symbolic
reaches into the materials of a 'higher' class.236

230. DITTMAR, supra note 181, at 69.
231. Id. at 66; Richins & Rudmin, supra note 211, at 218-20, 226. But see DITTMAR, supra
note 181, at 73 (stating that identity does not equal self: identity is what one expresses to others and
what others actually perceive, while self is what one believes about oneself).
232. DITTMAR, supra note 181, at 73-9; see also Gustav Ichheiser, Real, Pseudo and Sham
Qualities of Personality: An Attempt at a New Classification System, 9 CHARACTER &
PERSONALITY [now J. PERSONALITY] 218, 218-26 (1941).
233. See supra Part III.A & B.
234. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3.
235. JAMES AGEE AND & WALKER EvANS, LET Us Now PRAISE FAMouS MEN, 25-26 (1960).
236. Id. at 275-76.
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These examples reinforce the theory that possessions are important for
purposes of cultural identity.
If we apply the social constructionist theory to creators we see the
possibility for a tie-in between the desire to own the creation, to call it
"mine," and the culturally symbolic perception of self. This is achieved
through possession, attribution, and exchange for other possessions.
With respect to actual possession of the creation, the creator would use
this possession for purposes of cultural identity.237 As for copyright
issues, such as attribution, again, cultural identity will be achieved. The
cultural identity is affected by the ego stimulus of fame which "like a
'
drunkard consumes the house of the soul."238
Additionally, attribution assists the creator in her desire for society
to perceive her in a certain way based upon her creations. If the creator
did not care about external perceptions, attribution would not be a
priority. However, we have seen that attribution is very important to
many creators, and this leads to the conclusion that there is some desire
to express one's identity to others through the creative process.
With respect to the desire to own a creation or the rights to copy
and disseminate the creation for purposes of exchange, once again this
property interest provides the creator with the economic mechanism
with which to purchase possessions through which she may culturally
express herself. Accordingly, the creator has an expressive interest in
both possession of the creation as well as the intangible right to make
copies.

V. CONCLUSION

Perhaps Justice Holmes provided the best explanation regarding the
existence of property, and by extension intellectual property, when he
was discussing the notion of property by prescription: "It is in the
nature of man's mind."23 ' Things exist and some things are given the
essence of property by man's mind. But this essence of property
regarding intellectual property, specifically copyright, is not one of
instinct as it is not universal. Rather, this essence has many faces that
are formed by culture and need. There have been many attempts to
explain and justify property rights based upon a variety of
philosophical and psychological theories but little attempt to do the
237.
238.
Beck ed.,
239.

See, e.g., id. at 25-26, 275-76.
See Malcolm Lowry, in JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 876 (Emily Morison
15th ed. 1980).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofLaw, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 476-77 (1897).
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same with intellectual property. So is there one theory or philosophy
that best explains the essence justification for intellectual property law?
No; it exists because enough people for a length of time have called
expressions and their reproduction "mine." Perhaps to some this is no
answer, so to them I say sometimes "[t]here ain't no answer. There
ain't gonna be any answer. There never has never been an answer.
That's the answer." 2"

240. FORTUNE'S FORMULA: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE SCIENTiFIc BETTING SYSTEM THAT
BEAT THE CASINOS AND WALL STREET 346 (illustrated ed., 2006) (2006) (attributing the

accompanying text to Gertrude Stein).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss2/2

38

